# 08. AuthenticationPart 3& Access Control



Blase Ur and David Cash January 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2023 CMSC 23200 / 33250



# **User-Centered Security**

#### Some Ways to Understand Users

- Retrospective analysis of user-created password breaches
- Large-scale online studies
- Examine real passwords with permission
- Qualitative studies

# How Do We Help Users Make Better Passwords?

#### Problem 1: Bad Advice

#### Carnegie Mellon University

#### Password Requirements

#### **Must Contain**

- · At least 8-characters.
- At least one uppercase alphabetic character (e.g., A-Z).
- At least one lowercase alphabetic character (e.g., a-z).
- At least one number (e.g., 0-9).
- At least one special character (e.g., []~!@#\$%^&\*()?<>./\_-+=).

#### **Cannot Contain**

- Known information (i.e., first name, last name, Andrew userID, date of birth, 9-digit Carnegie Mellon ID number, SSN, job title).
- Four or more occurrences of the same character (e.g., aaaa, 2222, a123a345a678a).\*
- A word that is found in a standard dictionary.\*
   (after removing non-alpha characters).

\*This requirement does not apply to Andrew account passwords that are more than 19 characters in length (e.g., passphrase).

#### **Additional Policies**

- Last five passwords cannot be used.
- · Cannot be changed more than four times in a day.

#### Problem 2: Inaccurate Feedback




### Problem 3: Unhelpful Feedback




## Proactive Strength Checking

- Initial idea: provide feedback
- In practice: complexities regarding what to model, and how to do so efficiently




## Meters' Security & Usability Impact



Blase Ur, Patrick Gage Kelley, Saranga Komanduri, Joel Lee, Michael Maass, Michelle Mazurek, Timothy Passaro, Richard Shay, Timothy Vidas, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, Lorrie Faith Cranor. How Does Your Password Measure Up? The Effect of Strength Meters on Password Creation. In *Proc. USENIX Security Symposium*, 2012.

## Meters Are Ubiquitous



### Test Meters' Impact

- How do meters impact password security?
- How do meters impact usability?
  - Memorability
  - User sentiment
  - Timing
- What meter features matter?
- 2,931-participant online study

#### Baseline Password Meter



#### Create a password

Account Password

A strong password helps prevent unauthorized access to your email account.

Type new password:	
	8-character minimum; case sensitive
Password strength:	Bad. Consider adding an uppercase letter or making your password longer.
Retype new password:	
	Make my password expire every 72 days.
	Save

#### Visual Differences

usenIX Type new password: 8-character minimum; case sensitive Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer. Baseline meter Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer. Three-segment Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer. Green Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer. Tiny Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer. Huge Fair. No suggestions Text-only Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.

#### Visual Differences


Type new password:

usenIX

8-character minimum; case sensitive

Baseline meter

Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.



Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.

Green

Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.

Tiny


Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.



Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.

No suggestions

Fair.



Fair. Consider adding a digit or making your password longer.

## Scoring Differences

usenIX\$e5 Type new password: 8-character minimum; case sensitive Excellent! Baseline meter Poor. Consider adding a different symbol or making your password longer. Half-score Bad. Consider adding a different symbol or making your password longer. One-third-score Poor. Consider making your password longer. Nudge-16 Excellent! Nudge-Comp8


## Key Results

- Stringent meters with visual bars increased resistance to guessing
- Visual differences did not significantly impact resistance to guessing
- No significant impact on memorability

# Authentication in Practice: Moving Towards A Passwordless World?

#### Case Study: WebAuthn

### FIDO2 BRINGS SIMPLER, STRONGER AUTHENTICATION TO WEB BROWSERS



#### FIDO AUTHENTICATION: THE NEW GOLD STANDARD



Protects against phishing, man-in-the-middle and attacks using stolen credentials




Log in with a single gesture – HASSLE FREE!



Already supported in market by top online services

#### Case Study: WebAuthn

- Created under the FIDO2 project, now a W3C standard
- Goal: Authenticate on web using public-key crypto
- Implemented in specialized hardware OR in software using a TPM/TEE



#### Case Study: WebAuthn

User interaction: Push a button on a key, type a PIN into the device, present biometric (fingerprint) to hardware reader





# Authentication in Practice: Password Add-Ons / Alternatives

# Single Sign-On



**Login with Facebook** 





## Single Sign-On: Shibboleth






Diagram from <a href="https://docs.shib.ncsu.edu/docs/shibworks.html">https://docs.shib.ncsu.edu/docs/shibworks.html</a>
For a good (long) explanation, see: <a href="https://www.switch.ch/aai/demo/">https://www.switch.ch/aai/demo/</a>

#### **Two-Factor Auth**









### Physical Tokens / Smart Cards

- Codes based on a cryptographic key
  - Token manufacturer also knows the key
- What if there is a breach?





# Authentication in Practice: I Forgot My Password

## Resetting Accounts

- I forgot my password!
- Send an email?
- Security questions?
- In-person verification?
- Other steps?
- (No backup)

# Authentication in Practice: Password Managers

#### Password Managers

- Trust all passwords to a single master password (still a good idea in most cases)
  - Also trust software
  - Centralized vs. decentralized architectures








# Authentication in Practice: Password Reuse ©

#### Password Reuse-Based Attacks



Maximilian Golla, Miranda Wei, Juliette Hainline, Lydia Filipe, Markus Dürmuth, Elissa Redmiles, Blase Ur. "What was that site doing with my Facebook Password?" Designing Password-Reuse Notifications. In *Proc. CCS*, 2018.

#### People Reuse Passwords






#### Memory-Hard Hash Function



Email	Argon2i Hash of Password
jim@mail.com	\$argon2i\$v=19\$m=4096,
<b></b>	

# Rate-Limiting Guessing I'm not a robot reCAPTCHA Privacy - Terms



Your password could be better.

Consider inserting digits into the middle, not just at the end

Make your password longer than 8 characters

Consider using 1 or more symbols

A better choice: \a#D18cmccs

How to make strong passwords



#### **Email**

...

jim@mail.com

. . .



#### **Email**

jane@aol.com

jessey@gmx.net

jenny@gmail.com

jim@mail.com


john@hotmail.com

. . .



Email	SHA-1 Hash of Password
jane@aol.com	7c4a8d09ca3762af61e595209
jessey@gmx.net	5baa61e4c9b93f3f0682250b6
jenny@gmail.com	7c222fb2927d828af22f59213
jim@mail.com	ba93664a90285b9ff18a7a081
john@hotmail.com	b1b3773a05c0ed0176787a4f1

#### Crack All The Things!






Email	Cracked SHA-1 Hashes
jane@aol.com	123456
jessey@gmx.net	5baa61e4c9b93f3f0682250b6
jenny@gmail.com	Canada4ever
jim@mail.com	R0cky!17
john@hotmail.com	HikingGuy89

#### **Dead On Arrival**






1 guess is enough!



Email	Cracked SHA-1 Hashes
jane@aol.com	123456
jessey@gmx.net	5baa61e4c9b93f3f068225 0b6
jenny@gmail.com	Canada4ever
jim@mail.com	ROcky!17
john@hotmail.com	HikingGuy89

#### Monitoring the Black Market




SECURITY


### Facebook buys black market passwords to keep your account safe

The company's security chief says account safety is about more than just building secure software.

BY KATIE COLLINS | NOVEMBER 9, 2016 12:56 PM PST




#### Password-Reuse Notifications





# Authentication in Practice: Checking for Compromised Credentials

#### Checking for Compromised Credentials









https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-launches-password-checkup-feature-will-add-it-to-chrome-later-this-year/https://ios.gadgethacks.com/how-to/ios-14-monitors-your-passwords-protect-you-against-data-breaches-heres-works-0341281/

#### Checking for Compromised Credentials

#### **Under the hood:**

How Password Checkup helps keep your accounts safe




### What about Biometrics?




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
#### **Biometrics**


- Fingerprint
- Iris scans or retina scans
- Face recognition
- Finger/hand geometry
- Voice or speech recognition
- The way you type
- (Many others)

#### Practical Challenges for Biometrics

- Immutable (can't be changed)
- Potentially sensitive data
- High equipment costs
- Sensitive to changes in the environment
- Biometrics can change over time

#### Storing Biometrics: Templates










## Android Face Unlock



#### **Smartphone Biometrics**

- Purpose is to reduce the number of times a user must enter their password
- Falls back to the password
- Face recognition can be tricked by a photo
- Fingerprint recognition can be tricked by a gummy mold
- Users find fingerprint unlock convenient, but do not particularly like face unlock

#### **Authentication Conclusions**

- Authentication is really hard!
  - Hard for system administrators
  - Hard for users
- Unfortunately, authentication is necessary

### Access Control

#### Access Control: Basic Instantiation

- File permissions on UNIX:
  - Owner, Group, Others
- Useful commands
  - chown (change owner of a file)
    - chown blase:plantnerds rareplants.txt
  - chmod (change modes of a file)
    - chmod g+w rareplants.txt (user group others, add + or remove -, read write execute)
    - chmod 750 rareplants.txt (additive: 0 = nothing,
      1 = execute, 2 = write, 4 = read)

#### **Access Control**

- Role-based access control
  - Authorization based on role (e.g., "UChicago student")
- Attribute-based access control
  - Authorization based on attribute(s) (e.g., "Over 7 feet tall")
- Context-based access control
  - Authorization decision depends on the context (e.g., time of day)