# Hash Functions, Public-Key Encryption CMSC 23200/33250, Autumn 2018, Lecture 6

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#### Plan


- 1. A few points about hash functions
- 2. Introducing Public-Key Encryption
- 3. Math for RSA
- 4. Security properties of RSA

## Assignment 1 is Online and Due Next Wednesday

- 1. Start early. You can get bogged down in low-level bugs with bits or Python quirks.
- 2. Please report any "500 Internal Server" Errors privately on Piazza We will fix them to throw useful error messages.

#### **Hash Functions**

**Definition:** A <u>hash function</u> is a deterministic function H that reduces arbitrary strings to fixed-length outputs.



#### Output length

MD5: m = 128 bits

SHA-1: m = 160 bits

SHA-256: m = 256 bits

SHA-512: m = 512 bits

SHA-3:  $m \ge 224$  bits


#### Some security goals:

- collision resistance: can't find M!= M' such that H(M) = H(M')
- preimage resistance: given H(M), can't find M
- second-preimage resistance: given H(M), can't find M' s.t.

$$H(M') = H(M)$$

Note: Very different from hashes used in data structures!

#### Hash Functions are not MACs



Both map long inputs to short outputs... But a hash function does not take a key.

**Intuition**: a MAC is like a hash function, that only the holders of key can evaluate.

## Hash Function Security History

Breaking hash with 128-bit output takes 264 time (feasible).

- Can always find a collision in 2<sup>m/2</sup> time («2<sup>m</sup> time). "Birthday Attack"
- MD5 (1992) was broken in 2004 can now find collisions very quickly.
- SHA-1 (1995) was broken in 2017 A big computer can find collisions
- SHA-256/SHA-512 (2001) are not broken
- SHA-3 (2015) is new and not broken

MD5(

d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c 2fcab58712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89 55ad340609f4b30283e488832571415a 085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbdf280373c5b d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6 dd53e2b487da03fd02396306d248cda0 e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080a80d1e c69821bcb6a8839396f9652b6ff72a70

= MD5(


d131dd02c5e6eec4693d9a0698aff95c 2fcab50712467eab4004583eb8fb7f89 55ad340609f4b30283e4888325f1415a 085125e8f7cdc99fd91dbd7280373c5b d8823e3156348f5bae6dacd436c919c6 dd53e23487da03fd02396306d248cda0 e99f33420f577ee8ce54b67080280d1e c69821bcb6a8839396f965ab6ff72a70



Xiaoyun Wang (Tsinghua University), 2004

- Broken with clever techniques
- Compare to DES (broken b/c key too short)

# Why are collisions bad?



#### MACs from Hash Functions

Goal: Build a secure MAC out of a good hash function.

Common construction:  $MAC(K, M) = H(K \parallel M)$ 

- Totally insecure if H = MD5, SHA1, SHA-256, SHA-512 (Assignment 2)
- Is secure with SHA-3


Upshot: Use HMAC and avoid various issues.

Later: Hash functions and certificates

**Basic question:** If two people are talking in the presence of an eavesdropper, and they don't have pre-shared a key, is there any way they can send private messages?

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Diffie and Hellman in 1976: **Yes!** 

Turing Award, 2015, + Million Dollars Rivest, Shamir, Adleman in 1978: **Yes, differently!** 

Turing Award, 2002, + no money




Cocks, Ellis, Williamson in 1969, at GCHQ:

Yes, we know about both...


Pat on the back?

**Basic question:** If two people are talking in the presence of an eavesdropper, and they don't have pre-shared a key, is there any way they can send private messages?



Formally impossible (in some sense): No difference between receiver and adversary.


**Basic question:** If two people are talking in the presence of an eavesdropper, and they don't have pre-shared a key, is there any way they can send private messages?




**Definition**. A <u>public-key encryption scheme</u> consists of three algorithms **Kg**, **Enc**, and **Dec** 

- Key generation algorithm Kg, takes no input and outputs a (random) public-key/secret key pair (PK,SK)
- Encryption algorithm Enc, takes input the public key PK and the plaintext M, outputs ciphertext C←Enc(PK,M)
- Decryption algorithm Dec, is such that Dec(SK,Enc(PK,M))=M

## Public-Key Encryption in Action



# All known Public-Key Encryption uses...



$$N = pq$$

#### Some RSA Math

Called "2048-bit primes"

## **RSA** setup

p and q be large prime numbers (e.g. around 2<sup>2048</sup>)

N = pq

N is called the **modulus** 

### Modular Arithmetic: Two sets

$$\mathbb{Z}_{N} = \{0,1,\dots,N-1\}$$

$$\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*} = \{i : \gcd(i,N) = 1\} \quad (\mathbb{Z}_{N}^{*} \subsetneq \mathbb{Z}_{N})$$

gcd = "greatest common divisor"

## Examples:

$$\mathbb{Z}_{13}^* = \{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12\}$$
  
 $\mathbb{Z}_{15}^* = \{1,2,4,7,8,11,13,14\}$ 

Defintion: 
$$\phi(N) = |\mathbb{Z}_N^*|$$

$$\phi(13) = 12$$
  $\phi(15) = 8$ 

#### **Modular Arithmetic**

#### **Definition**

 $x \mod N$  means the remainder when x is divided by N.

$$\mathbb{Z}_{15}^* = \{1,2,4,7,8,11,13,14\}$$

$$2 \times 4 = 8 \mod 15 \qquad 13 \times 8 = 14 \mod 15$$

#### Theorem:

 $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  is "closed under multiplication modulo N".

# RSA "Trapdoor Function"

**Lemma:** Suppose  $e, d \in \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^*$  satisfy  $ed = 1 \mod \phi(N)$ . Then for any  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N$  we have that

$$(x^e)^d = x^{ed} = x \mod N$$

**Example:** N = 15,  $\phi(N) = 8$ , e = 3, d = 3


The satisfy condition in lemma:  $ed = 3 \cdot 3 = 9 = 1 \mod 8$ 

So "powering by 3" always un-does itself.

$$(5^3)^3 = 5^9 = 1953125 = 5 \mod 15$$

Usually e and d are different.

## RSA "Trapdoor Function"



Finding "e-th roots modulo N" is hard. Contrast is usual arithmetic, where finding roots is easy.

## RSA "Trapdoor Function"

$$PK = (N, e)$$
  $SK = (N, d)$  where  $N = pq$ ,  $ed = 1 \mod \phi(N)$ 

$$\operatorname{Enc}((N, e), M) = M^e \operatorname{mod} N$$

$$Dec((N, d), C) = C^d \mod N$$

Messages and ciphertexts are in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ 

#### Setting up RSA:

- Need two large random primes
- Have to pick e and then find d
- Don't worry about how exactly

## Encryption with the RSA Trapdoor Function?

- Several problems
  - Encryption of 1 is 1
  - e=3 is popular. Encryption of 2 is 8... (no wrapping mod N)
  - RSA Trapdoor Function is deterministic


**Solution**: Pad input M using random (structured) bits.


- Serves purpose of padding and nonce/IV randomization


## PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA Encryption

N: n-byte long integer.

Want to encrypt m-byte messages.







- 1. pad ← (n-m-3) random non-zero bytes.
- 2. X←00 | | 02 | | pad | | 00 | | M
- 3. Output % mod N


#### Dec((N,d),M):

- 1. X← Cd mod N
- 2. Parse X = aa | bb | rest
- 3. If aa≠00 or bb≠02 or 00∉rest:
  Output ERROR
- 4. Parse rest = pad | | 00 | | M
- 5. Return M



# Bleichenbacher's Padding Oracle Attack (1998)





System (e.g. webserver)
SK=(N,d)

Infer something about (C') d mod N

Info about x


Originally needed millions of **c'**. Best currently about 10,000.

```
Dec((N,d),M):
```

- 1.  $X \leftarrow C^d \mod N$
- 2. Parse X = aa | bb | rest
- -3.If aa≠00 or bb≠02 or 00∉rest: Output ERROR
- 4. Parse rest = pad | | 00 | | M
- 5. Return M

## Better Padding: RSA-OAEP

RSA-OAEP [Bellare and Rogaway, '94] prevents padding-oracle attacks with better padding using a hash function.



(Then apply RSA trapdoor function.)

The End